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1MOVEABLE TYPE
‘News that Stays News’
Literature and Historical Distance
by Derek Attridge
As imperceptibly as Grief
The summer lapsed away –
Too imperceptible at last
To seem like Perﬁdy – 1
I read the opening of a poem written about 140 years ago and it 
strikes me with the force of the new. I’m surprised by the equation 
of ‘summer’ and ‘grief’; by the speciﬁcity of the word ‘lapsed’; by the 
oddness of the phrase ‘lapsed away’; by the implicit argument that 
imperceptibility of disappearance lessens the sense of betrayal; by 
the force of the word ‘perﬁdy’, especially coming as a climax to the 
stanza and carrying two of the line’s three beats; by the simplicity 
of the rhythmic form, redolent of nursery rhymes, in contrast to the 
complexity of the thought; by the avoidance of the expected rhyme 
after ‘away’; and by the occurrence in its place of the half-rhyme of 
‘Perﬁdy’. Yet it’s surprising that I’m surprised, as I’ve read this stanza 
twenty or thirty times before, over at least forty years. And although 
when it was written in 1865, or when it was ﬁrst published in 1891, 
there was little in the tradition of English verse like it, and even forty 
years ago — when I wrote an undergraduate dissertation on Emily 
Dickinson’s poems — it would have been relatively unfamiliar to 
readers of poetry, it now belongs to a highly familiar poetic landscape. 
Dickinson’s terse, lexically innovative hymn-metre poems are as well-
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known as any in the canon, and their simple, memorable form has 
made them popular well outside the academic world.
It seems that the ‘new’ in art is not simply a literal newness, but a 
quality that somehow can survive historical and cultural change. 
In what follows I want to examine some aspects of this paradoxical 
quality.
That there is a close association between the idea of the ‘new’ and 
the idea of ‘art’ itself, at least in Western culture, is evident from 
almost any history of painting, or architecture, or music, or literature. 
Such histories present the story of a succession of new styles, new 
techniques, new ﬁelds of subject-matter, new modes of representation 
or challenges to representation. This centrality of novelty has not 
been fully theorized, however, perhaps because it hasn’t been central 
to the tradition of aesthetic theory, dominated by the philosophy of 
Kant and its focus on such questions as beauty, sublimity, autonomy, 
disinterestedness, harmony, and universality. Kant, it’s true, 
commented brieﬂy on originality in the Critique of Judgement, and 
linked what he called ‘exemplary originality’ with ‘genius’ — a term 
that became immensely important for Romantic aesthetics. And there 
is a long tradition of conceptions of the artist as creator, the poet as 
maker, and so on. But we don’t have an adequate account of the role 
of newness or innovation in the reception of art — which, I would 
argue, means that we don’t have an adequate account of art, since it’s 
in their reception that artworks have their being as art.
Why should we value a work of art because it arrived on its historical 
scene with the shock of the new? Is this fact of more than historical 
interest? We can praise Christopher Marlowe or Gerard Manley 
Hopkins for achieving newness in their writing, unprepared for by 
cultural context within which they wrote, but does this have anything 
to do with the meaning or worth of their work today?
In The Singularity of Literature I tried to clarify some of these tangled 
issues by separating out the concept of originality, in the Kantian 
sense of exemplary originality (originality that provides a spur to 
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fresh creativity in others), from other related terms.2 Originality is 
a historical fact: a property of a created work or idea understood in 
relation to the cultural context of its production and reception. It’s 
not conﬁned to art; we’re familiar with originality in many other 
ﬁelds, including the scientiﬁc, the philosophical, the mechanical and 
the theological. It’s not just a matter of difference — difference occurs 
endlessly and mostly without signiﬁcant effects — but of a difference 
that changes the possibilities within its ﬁeld for the future. So to 
appreciate originality, one has to undertake a historical exercise. For 
instance, to assess properly, and perhaps enjoy, the originality of 
Lyrical Ballads one needs to make oneself familiar with the poetry 
published in volumes and magazines in Britain in the late eighteenth 
century.
Originality, therefore, is always subject to revision, as historical 
knowledge grows and is corrected. The originality of Lyrical Ballads — 
as experienced by the informed reader — diminished after 1954 when 
a widely read study of magazine lyrics of the period was published.3 In 
the ﬁeld of literature, the apprehension and appreciation of originality 
is variably accessible to individuals depending on the degree of their 
historical knowledge. It is indisputably one aspect of the experience 
of the reader possessed of the requisite knowledge in reading a work 
of the past; if you’re very familiar with Tudor lyric poetry you will read 
Wyatt’s ‘They ﬂee from me’ with a pleasurable sense of its striking 
novelty in its time — but it is clearly not all there is to our experience 
of newness in a literary work.
A couple of well-known statements by Pound suggest that the sense of 
newness is not just a question of historical knowledge:
Literature is news that STAYS news.
A classic [. . .] is a classic because of a certain eternal and irrepressible 
freshness.4
I would dispute the ‘eternal’, but Pound seems to be pointing to 
something real and widely acknowledged about our encounters with 
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art. My earlier comments on ‘As imperceptibly as Grief’ were pointing 
to the same feeling. In The Singularity of Literature I quoted F. R. 
Leavis, who comments on the experience of reading through The 
Oxford Book of Seventeenth-Century Verse and coming to the poetry 
of Donne:
The extraordinary force of originality that made Donne so potent an 
inﬂuence in the seventeenth century makes him now at once for us, 
without his being the less felt as of his period, contemporary.5
Leavis makes a strong claim here: that what makes Donne seem 
contemporary now is just what made him original (with exemplary 
originality) in his own day. This is clearly allied to Pound’s ‘news’ 
and ‘freshness’, and there is ample testimony to this response as a 
familiar experience: as we read we sense something like newness, an 
opening onto new possibilities, even if we’re reading the work for the 
umpteenth time.
We don’t, however, have this experience if we view a machine, or 
follow through a theorem, or read a philosophical argument that was 
highly original in its time but has become part of the familiar world 
today. (Unless, that is, we are reading it — to some degree, at least 
— as literature.) This is the puzzle and the paradox of ‘the new’ in 
art: not just that artists can produce works that break with existing 
norms and create new avenues for later art, but that this ‘newness’ 
appears capable of transcending historical time, that it’s part of the 
reading, or viewing, or listening experience, and of repeated readings, 
viewings, and listenings. And that one doesn’t have to have historical 
knowledge about the work to participate in this experience.
The term I’ve used to capture this property of artworks is invention, the 
quality of newness being inventiveness. Invention happens both within 
and to a culture; it’s not a merely private feat of bringing something 
into being (for which I reserve the term creation) but an intervention 
in the public domain. And it happens both in the production of art 
and its reception. How can it be explained? Traditionally, an appeal 
has been made to ‘human universals’ that allow time and place to be 
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transcended. (Pound’s reference to an ‘eternal’ freshness suggests this 
kind of appeal.) But this is a dubious explanation that in fact explains 
very little. I prefer to see human values, experiences, and practices 
as historically conditioned, and seek an explanation that accepts this 
framework.
An initial crucial point is that invention is an event. The result of 
the invention may be an artefact, but in the ﬁeld of art it is possible 
that this invention — we use the same word for the process and the 
product, which is one reason why it is a useful word — may never lose 
the quality of an event. And it is as an event that the artwork exists, 
not as an object. It’s only in the reader’s ‘performance’ of the work of 
literature that it comes into being as a work of art, as literature (and of 
course it can be read in many other ways — as a historical document, 
as a psychological document, as a linguistic example, and so on).
So when Leavis reads
I wonder by my troth, what thou, and I
Did, till we lov’d?...6
he is experiencing the inventiveness of this opening onto new 
possibilities, as I am when I read ‘As imperceptibly as Grief’. But we 
need to ask whether he or I are responding, as Leavis claims, to the 
same features that Donne’s and Dickinson’s contemporaries would 
have found fresh and inventive? Perhaps — but this is not a necessary 
condition of Leavis’s experience. There can’t be a literal transcendence 
of time; it follows from the fact that the work of art is constituted 
again and again in the acts of its reception that history continually 
changes it. What is important is the experience — which may be an 
illusion — of a reaching back to originary inventiveness on the part of 
the author.
In other words, the poem as poem has its being in the present, in the 
performance of the reader (even if it is being read silently); and if 
it is experienced as new, fresh, inventive, this newness must be felt 
to be an aspect of the event of the poem’s invention. (This is not the 
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same as an awareness of the poem’s originality in its seventeenth-
century context — though as we’ve seen, this can play a part on the 
knowledgeable reader’s response as well.) If I’m right that the work 
of art — even the painting or sculpture — has its existence qua work 
of art only as an event, we can see that inventiveness in art is not 
the introduction into the world of new knowledge or content (though 
that could well be part of a work’s originality), but of new ways of 
handling, presenting, forming knowledge or content. In literature, this 
means the fresh deployment of meanings, sounds, rhythms, generic 
expectations, narrative developments, allusions, etc.
This is why I believe the study of what has traditionally been called 
‘form’ is crucial — but form has to be understood as taking place as an 
event in the reading of the work, and as including, not being opposed 
to, meaning (a word which should also be taken in a verbal sense).
Drawing on Derrida’s indispensable essay ‘Psyche: Invention of the 
Other’, we can relate the event of invention to two other properties: 
alterity (or otherness) and singularity.7 The event of invention brings 
into the culture that which is other to it, changing the culture in 
order to make it apprehensible. And this inventive other is a singular 
formation of cultural materials.
When we read a work of literature written some time ago, and 
experience its singularity — its difference from all other works we 
know — this comes across as otherness, as a resistance, however slight, 
to the familiar norms by which we see the world (the comparison of 
‘summer’ to ‘grief’, for instance). It also comes across as inventiveness, 
as the inventiveness of the author, whether this is historically accurate 
or not. (It would not change the poem’s inventiveness to discover that 
it was actually written by Lavinia Dickinson — though anyone who 
had studied the work of Emily Dickinson in relation to her biography 
would ﬁnd their view of the poem inevitably changed.)
This question of temporal distance is really only a part of a wider 
question, which we may term cultural distance. In this case, the distance 
is produced by time, but the same issues arise in reading contemporary 
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work from a different culture. If I read a novel by Haruki Murakami and 
experience its inventiveness, I automatically ascribe this inventiveness 
to Murakami — but for all I know what I am responding to in this way 
is purely conventional within Japanese norms, and I am missing what 
is inventive according to those norms.
The point is that I can respond only from my own situation, which is 
to say from the historical, cultural place I occupy — and that place is 
determined by my own trajectory through various overlapping, often 
contradictory, cultural formations. I call this nexus in the web of cultural 
determinations my idioculture, just as my idiolect is my individual mode 
of speech, absorbed from a number of different language communities 
in which I have lived.
There’s likely to be some cultural continuity between my situation and 
that of most of the works I ﬁnd myself reading. Thus seventeenth-century 
London educated culture has many afﬁnities with Leavis’s or mine, 
including the internalisation of certain poetic forms, uses of humour 
and irony, responses to sexual desire, etc. This means that a large part of 
Donne’s inventiveness is accessible to me. And in 2008, global culture 
is such that Murakami and I also share many mental frameworks: for 
example, we have probably read many of the same novels. However, we 
can never rule out chance effects. A work of art may become inventive 
in a new cultural context, just because it happens to speak inventively 
to that context. The self-reﬂexive irony of Tristram Shandy may be 
more fully appreciated in the age of postmodernism than in the more 
rule-conscious era of the later eighteenth century. There is a degree of 
contingency in the historical process, rendering some works especially 
visible at certain times while burying others.
What, then, is the responsibility of the reader or critic? First of all, to be 
attentive to the event of the work: to give oneself to the unfolding of its 
forms (linguistic, generic, semantic — all the ways in which its meanings 
are staged and relayed), something which presupposes a degree of formal 
and linguistic literacy; and to bring to bear on it all the resources of one’s 
own idioculture (including one’s ethical values and one’s hopes for the 
future), which presupposes an understanding of and sensitivity to one’s 
own situation.
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Then, to enhance one’s reading, to narrow the cultural gap between 
oneself and the work in its moment of production (and of course there 
is always a gap, even if it is only a small one) — not only to get a 
stronger sense of the work’s originality in its time, but also because 
its newness in the present will be enhanced by increased knowledge 
of the conventions within (or against) which the work was written, 
of the linguistic usages of the time, of the events, places, customs, 
personages referred to, and of other works from the same time and 
place.
Of course, literature can be the object of study in many other important 
ways. It can serve as a historical index, providing information about 
an earlier period or a faraway place; it can be scrutinized as evidence 
for ideological assumptions and political pressures; and it can provide 
material for biographical or psychoanalytic analysis of the author. 
What I’m suggesting is that these approaches treat literary works as 
something other than literature; and that, if we attend to the experience 
of newness or inventiveness that characterises the best of living art, 
we will be more likely to do justice to literary works as distinctive 
interventions in cultural history, and as valuable resources to draw 
on in our own engagements with the ethical and political demands of 
our time and place.
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